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ABSTRACT 
 
The following arguments are presented. 1) Corruption in its various forms is a serious social ill. 2) 
Democracy is not a safe cure against corruption. 3) Increased gender equality seems to be one im-
portant factor behind getting corruption under control. 4) Impartiality in the exercise of public 
power, not least, when it “translates” into meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the public 
administration, has a powerful effect on lowering corruption. 5) While some aspects of impartiality 
are central for gender equality, research results are mixed. Some show that impartial principles 
promotes gender equality, others show that gender bias exists also in many processes designed to 
be impartial. Going from these results to policy recommendation is thus fraught with many difficul-
ties. One is how to handle problems of legitimacy in the implementation process for various forms 
of preferential treatment of discriminated groups. Since these problems are impossible to handle, 
we may be in for a “Churchillian” argument. Like representative democracy, meritocracy may be a 
far from ideal solution for lowering corruption and thereby promoting human well-being, but it 
may be the least bad of existing alternatives. 
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Introduction 
In an article titled “Medical Care in Romania Comes at an Extra Cost”, New York Times (March 9, 
2009) reported the following story: “Alina Lungu, 30, said she did everything necessary to ensure a 
healthy pregnancy in Romania: she ate organic food, swam daily and bribed her gynecologist with 
an extra $255 in cash, paid in monthly instalments handed over discreetly in white envelopes. She 
paid a nurse about $32 extra to guarantee an epidural and even gave about $13 to the orderly to 
make sure he did not drop the stretcher. But on the day of her delivery, she said, her gynecologist 
never arrived. Twelve hours into labor, she was left alone in her room for an hour. A doctor finally 
appeared and found that the umbilical cord was wrapped twice around her baby’s neck and had 
nearly suffocated him. He was born blind and deaf and is severely brain damaged…..  Alina and her 
husband, Ionut, despair that the bribes they paid were not enough to prevent the negligence that 
they say harmed their son, Sebastian. “Doctors are so used to getting bribes in Romania that you 
now have to pay more in order to even get their attention,” she said.”1  
 
This story is just one of what is an almost endless stream of media coverage of how corruption 
affects the life of people around the world (cf. WorldBank 2010). Using more “hard” measures, 
there is by now overwhelming support for stating that corruption, in its many forms, has massive 
negative effects on human well-being. This includes but is not limited to economic prosperity, all 
standard measures population health, subjective well-being, (a.k.a. “happiness”), social trust, social 
mobility, poverty, economic inequality and political legitimacy. There are now also studies showing 
that corruption has a causal effect on the outburst of civil strife, civil wars and interstate wars (for 
references see Rothstein and Tannenberg 2015). It is also the case that from being largely an ig-
nored issue in research and policy well into the late 1990s, the problem of corruption has received 
increased attention during the last fifteen or so years. In academic research this can be seen in the 
stark increase in the number of scholarly articles published that deals with corruption. A search in 
the Thompson’s Web of Science database for scholarly articles that include the term “political cor-
ruption” as a key word, illustrates the relative novelty of the field and the very recent surge in inter-
est in corruption research. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/world/europe/09bribery.html?pagewanted=all 
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FIGURE 1, ARTICLES PUBLISHED ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION (THOMSON WEB OF SCIENCE, 
2015) 
 
 
In public policy this increasing attention is evident from the many international as well as national 
development and aid organizations that have become engaged this problem. In addition, a number 
of NGOs and civil society organizations have put corruption as a central issue on their agendas. 
The current President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, stated in his speech of 19th December 
2013, that “in the developing world, corruption is public enemy No. 1”. As reported by Reuters2, 
this announcement showed how much this world leading development organization had changed 
since the 1990s when the issue was taboo in the Bank because it should not interfere in the internal 
politics of the member states. This quite dramatic and recent change of focus of what is important 
for increasing human well-being (or avoiding human misery) is not confined to the academic and 
policy elites. According to a BBC poll in 2010, surveying 13,353 respondents in 26 countries, cor-
ruption is the most talked about issue globally, surpassing issues such as climate change, poverty 
and unemployment (Katzarova 2011).  
 
This attention and reorientation of focus in research and policy has also resulted in a massive in-
crease in programs launched by international and national organizations for alleviating the corrup-
tion problem. Under the euphemism of “good governance”, such programs have become central 
                                                     
2
 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-corruption-idUSBRE9BI11P20131219  
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for many developing countries as well. However, it is important to underscore that the corruption 
problem is not confined to the developing world. Several analyses if the economic problems in 
Greece and also of the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 have pointed at corruption as a 
main factor (Johnson 2009; Kaplanoglou and Rapanos 2013; Kaufmann 2008). 
 
From research to policy 
The not so good news is that the results of the many efforts to increase quality of government and 
get corruption under control have so far been surprisingly meagre. In a recent much acclaimed 
book, Francis Fukuyama writes that the international development and aid community “would like 
to turn Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and Haiti into idealized places like ‘Denmark’ but it doesn’t 
have to slightest idea of how to bring this about” (Fukuyama 2014, 25). In an even more recent 
book The Quest of Good Governance, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi states: “By and large, the evaluations piling 
up after the first fifteen years of anti-corruption work showed great expectations and humble re-
sults” (2015, 178). In a recent report to the OECD, Robert Klitgaard (2015) shows that the interna-
tional aid and development community cannot show one single country/case where a donor led 
good governance or anti-corruption program have resulted in a sustained improvement. This is not 
to say that there are no countries that have improved their control of corruption but these changes 
have not been achieved through any international aid and development policy. In any case, consid-
ering the money and policy energy that has gone into the “good governance” agenda from the in-
ternational aid and development regime, we are facing nothing less than a massive policy failure. 
This is, however, not the place for trying to explain this grand scale policy failure (but see Rothstein 
and Tannenberg 2015). Instead, the focus will be on the political and policy strategies that should 
be drawn from the recent result, namely that gender equality has a positive effect for lowering cor-
ruption. One reason for this focus on policy is that the step from research results to policy is a 
complicated one and that it is neither self-evident nor non-normative to make this step.3 Research 
results do not automatically translate into policy recommendations since the latter must consider a 
                                                     
3
 One day, the biologists come out from their labs and say to the world: We have now found the gene and we can with 
confidence say that homosexuality is genetically/biologically determined. Depending on our normative orientations, two 
completely different policies can follow. One is of course that homosexuality is completely “natural”, like being red-
haired and we have therefore absolutely no reason for discriminating people with this sexual orientation. However, it is 
also possible to take the position that we should spend tons of money to find a medical treatment for this behavior. The 
same reasoning would follow if or colleagues in biology would come out from their labs and say that they have now 
evidence that there is no genetic or biological factor that can explain homosexuality so this sexual orientation must be a 
somehow “socially constructed”. Depending on our normative orientation, we can either say that in a liberal democracy, 
people have the right to “construct” themselves as they please. Or one can say that this is a behavior that is “chosen” 
and therefore the ones that make this choice have to take the consequences, including being discriminated (adapted 
from Brown 2001). 
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number of issues related both to normative problems of legitimacy (what should the state do) and 
empirical issues related to possible problems that can occur in the implementation process. I will 
leave the normative issues for now since I have dealt with them extensively elsewhere (see Roth-
stein and Varraich 2016). Instead, I would like to underline that neglecting possible problems in the 
implementation process may result in the creating of “bureaucratic nightmares” that can seriously 
undermine the legitimacy of the policy in question leading to a political “backlash” against the poli-
cy. 
 
Another reason for taking the issue of how to move from research results to policy seriously is of 
course that we are not dealing with just a theoretical/conceptual issue but with a “real life” problem 
as people around the world are literally “dying of corruption” (Holmberg and Rothstein 2011). 
Given the massive policy failure and the huge lack of knowledge of how to get societies to break 
out of systemic corruption, we are in desperate need of “institutional devices” that we as scholars 
with some confidence can present to the policy community.  However, it is important that we do 
not present institutional solutions that are not possible to implement or that would create a back-
lash in terms of legitimacy (Rothstein 2016).  If we make mistakes in how we recommend that the 
move from research results to policy should be done, the costs in terms of human well-being will 
be huge.   
 
The problem of paying attention to legitimacy in the policy implementation is well illustrated in 
Theda Skocpol’s “modern classic” Promoting Soldiers and Mothers. As Skocpol shows, the social insur-
ance sector in the U.S. was quite large during the late 19th century. A central part of this was the 
pension system for war veterans who participated in the Civil War and their dependent family 
members, a program that during the decades after the end of the war became a huge operation 
both in terms of finances and the number of people that were supported. The problem, however, 
was that the system for deciding eligibility was complicated and entailed a large portion of adminis-
trative discretion. It is not difficult to imagine the kind of health issues that should count as result-
ing from combat or military service in general. However, to determine the issues that are due to the 
general bodily fragilities that come with aging is a delicate and complicated problem to solve in each 
and every case. The result was that "the statutes quickly became so bewildering complex that there 
was much room for interpretation of cases" (Skocpol 1992, 121). What happened was that the war 
veteran pension administration became a source for political patronage and corruption: 
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Because the very successes of Civil War pensions were so closely tied to the workings of patronage 
democracy, these successes set the stage for negative feedbacks that profoundly affected the future 
direction of U.S. social provisions. During the Progressive Era, the precedent of Civil War pensions 
was constantly invoked by many American elites as a reason for opposing or delaying any move 
toward more general old-age pensions.... Moreover, the party-based "corruption" that many U.S. 
reformers associated with the implementation of Civil War pensions prompted them to argue that 
the United States could not administer any new social spending programs efficiently or honestly 
(Skocpol 1992, 59) 
 
The point Skocpol makes is that the reason for why the United States of today has a comparatively 
small, targeted and not very redistributive welfare state cannot be explained only by the lack of a 
Social Democratic type of labour movement or with references to normative ideals about the popu-
lation being devoted to a “rugged individualism”. On the contrary, the U.S. welfare state was com-
paratively well developed at the beginning of the 20th century. But it was thereafter politically dele-
gitimized due to what was generally perceived of as its low quality of government. Or in other 
words, the Civil War pension system had turned into an “administrative nightmare” that severely 
de-legitimated the policy and thereby also served as an obstacle to getting support for future expan-
sion of social policies.  
 
More recently, Stefan Svallfors (2013) has analysed this issue using the 2010 European Social Sur-
vey for 29 European countries, which includes questions about the fairness and competence of 
public authorities (health sector and tax authorities), as well as questions about ideological leanings 
and policy preferences. His results show that citizens that state that they have a preference for more 
economic equality but that live in a country where they perceive that the quality of government 
institutions is low, will in the same survey indicate that they prefer lower taxes and less social 
spending. However, the same “ideological type” of respondent who happens to live in a European 
country where he or she believes that the authorities that implement policies are basically just and 
fair, will answer that he or she is willing to pay higher taxes for more social spending. Thus, percep-
tions about the quality of implementation process play a large role for achieving broad based politi-
cal support for policies for increased social justice, in which gender equality should certainly be 
included (see also Dahlström, Lindvall and Rothstein 2013; Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell 2012). 
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Quality of Government versus Quality of Democracy 
The quality of government (henceforth QoG) approach differs from established perspectives in 
political science in that it puts an emphasis on the output side of the political system over the input 
side (Rothstein 2011b; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Rothstein and Varraich 2016). This can also be 
conceptualized as a distinction between the access to and the exercise of political power, the latter 
being the central focus for the QoG approach. Democracy is in this context confined to the “in-
put” side of the political system and consists of “free and fair” elections and a set of political and 
civil rights. Quality of democracy can thus be understood as a combination of how “free and fair” 
the elections are and how well civil and political rights are protected. Quality of Government (i.e., 
output side) consists of things like the rule of law, the quality of the civil service and the effective-
ness of government agencies responsible for implementing public policies. The relevance of this 
approach can be seen from the two graphs below. They are built from an index constructed by 
Holmberg and Rothstein (2015) called the “Good Society Index” (GSI). Following the principle of 
Ockham’s razor it is deliberately made simple. The reason for this is analytical, namely that varia-
bles that can explain the variation in the GSI should not be included in the index. The GSI consists of 
only three types of data and covers 149 countries. The index combines WHO data on infant mor-
tality and life expectancy and United Nations’ and Gallup’s data on people´s subjective feeling of 
personal happiness. In a good society, one may argue, newborns should survive and people should 
grow old before they die. And in between birth and death, people should state that they are satis-
fied with their lives (Holmberg and Rothstein, 2015). The first figure below shows the simple corre-
lation between this index and one of the standard measures of QoG, namely the World Bank’s 
measure of Government Effectiveness. The second graph shows the GSI index correlation with a 
widely used measure of the level of democracy.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4
 Level of democracy scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The measure is 
composed by Hadenius and Teorell (2005:95) and consists of an average of Freedom House measures of civil and 
political liberties and the measures from Polity of electoral participation and competitiveness, as well as constraints on 
the executive. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and 
reliability than its constituent parts.  
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FIGURE 2, GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND THE GOOD SOCIETY INDEX 
 
 
FIGURE 3, LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY AND THE GOOD SOCIETY INDEX 
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As can be readily seen, while the correlation between this measure of QoG and the GSI is quite 
impressive, the opposite is the case for the correlation with the level of democracy. Thus, if human 
well-being is the goal, more attention to what takes place at the “output” side of the political system 
is needed (cf. Rothstein and Tannenberg 2015). 
 
Gender equality and corruption 
Research on the relationship between gender and corruption took off in early 2000s, after two 
World Bank connected research groups showed that countries with a high percentage of women in 
decision-making positions generally had lower levels of corruption, even when controlling for the 
level of democracy, economic development, and a number of additional factors (Dollar, Fisman 
and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). While some critique was brought forward on the grounds of 
the relationship being spurious, i.e. a well-functioning state both curbs corruption and promotes 
gender equality, others, in particular feminist scholars, critiqued how women’s participation in polit-
ical life was portrayed as a tool to combat corruption and not a goal in of itself. This school of 
thought turned the focus around and began studying how male networks shut women out from the 
inner sphere of political power, where a sizable share of corrupt transactions takes place. It is also 
argued that women in many countries are tied to the family and private sphere to a larger extent 
than men are and therefore have fewer opportunities to engage in corruption. It should be noted 
that this does not explain why women would contribute to lower corruption once faced with these 
opportunities. A third alternative theory suggests that the effects are sprung from women’s and 
men’s social roles, where women are socialized into avoiding risks and caring for others, thus mak-
ing their behavior less detrimental then men’s.  
 
Researchers at the Quality of Government Institute in Gothenburg have developed an alternative 
theory that focus more on rationality and where women’s choice of action is active. An underlying 
assumption is that women as a group not only have less power than men but also less economic 
resources. Refraining from corruption becomes rational in order to save scarce resources to pay for 
food, welfare of the children etc., which are seen as the women’s responsibility. Wängnerud (2012; 
2015) emphasizes that women who reach political positions often have a different background 
from their male colleagues. In Mexico, female politicians have typically started their careers within 
civil society organizations, and thus built their power base there (Grimes and Wangnerud 2010). 
Because corruption tends to undermine the relationship to the civil society, female politicians have 
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a rational incentive to refrain from corruption in order not to alienate their supporters and jeopard-
ize their political careers. Grimes and Wängnerud (2010) show that sub-national regions with high 
levels of female politicians exhibit lower levels of corruption than other regions. Moreover, regions 
with large shares of female politicians saw the perceived levels of corruption reduced from 2001 to 
2010, indicating that female politicians not only contribute to containing corruption levels but may 
also help break the sub optimal corruption equilibrium. Wängnerud argues that a high level of fe-
male politicians, in particular in developing countries, is often a result of pressure both from do-
mestic and international organizations, and when coinciding with a public debate on combating 
corruption, this may provide a window of opportunity for change.  
 
In many, if not most, countries in the world that are plagued by systemic corruption, a determined 
policy for increased gender equality can possibly be a “big bang” type of change that will upset a 
corrupt equilibrium (Rothstein 2011a). The starting point is of course that gender based discrimina-
tion in politics has been (and to a large extent still is) massive in most countries and significant 
change in this area is in itself a “big bang”. Secondly, moving from male-dominated politics to in-
creased female representation introduces new players, who can induce elite competition and con-
trol, i.e. a form of checks and balance. Thirdly, a significant increase of women representatives also 
sends a signal throughout society that there is a “new game in town” that typically receives a lot of 
media attention. To this one can add that most corruption is illegal and, as is well known from 
criminology, men are grossly overrepresented when it comes to committing serious crimes. The 
standard figure is that more than ninety percent of persons convicted of serious crimes are men 
(Maguire, Morgan and Reiner 2007). If this is a result of socially constructed templates for gendered 
behavior or if it is caused by some other more biological/genetic factors is not an issue that politi-
cal scientists in general (and certainly not this author) have the competence to solve. However, 
following this quite extreme difference in gendered behavior, it should not come as a surprise that, 
if women are given more positions of power in a political system, corruption would become less 
common, since most forms of corruption are illegal. From a policy perspective, one may take inspi-
ration from the Swedish health care law in this matter. According to this law, a treatment or drug 
can be prescribed on two grounds. The first is “scientific evidence” which implies that scientific 
knowledge has been established for how the causality works. The second ground according to the 
low is “known experience” which implies that scientific knowledge about how the causality be-
tween the treatment in question and the health of the patient does not exist. Still, experience shows 
that the treatment/drug improves the health of patient and this makes it legal for health care per-
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sonnel to prescribe and use the drug/ treatment in question.  For a serious problem like systemic 
corruption, if increased gender equality according to systematic experience results in improved  
quality of government, as a policy oriented social scientist I can see no reason why I should not 
recommend this “cure” even if I am not certain about how the micro-level causal mechanism(s) 
operate.5  The importance of a factor like gender equality should also be seen in the light of the 
quite troubling result that the introduction of democracy, contrary to what has often been taken for 
granted, does not work as a safe cure against corruption (Fukuyama 2014).  
 
What is corruption and what is the opposite of corruption? 
The standard definition of for example corruption has been variations on the theme "misuse of 
public position for private gain". The problem with this definition is partly that what counts as 
"abuse" is not specified resulting in a definition that is empty of substantial content. Another prob-
lem with this definition is that it invites relativism in the sense that what can be considered "abuse" 
in one country is not necessarily so in another country. Or in other words, with a definition like 
this, the ethical norm that is transgressed when we can say that an act is corrupt is unknown.  
 
The development of the international anti-corruption regime since the late 1990s has not been 
without its critiques. One point that has been stressed in this critique is that the international anti-
corruption agenda represents a specific western liberal ideal that is not easily applicable to countries 
outside that part of the world (Bracking 2007; Bratsis 2003; Bukovansky 2006; de Maria 2010; Hin-
dess 2005; Wedel 2014). There are at least two arguments against this type of relativistic conceptual 
framework. The first is normative and based on the similar discussion in the areas of universal hu-
man rights and the principles of representative democracy. First, the right not to be discriminated 
by public authorities, the right not to have to pay bribes for what should be free public services and 
the right to get treated with “equal concern and respect” from the courts are in fact not very distant 
for what counts as universal human rights. For example, for people that do not get the healthcare 
they are entitled to because they cannot afford the bribes the doctors’ demand, corruption can re-
sult in a life-threatening situation. The same can occur for citizens that do not get protection by the 
police because they do not belong to the “right” group. The second reason against a relativistic 
definition of corruption is empirical. Although the empirical research in this area is not entirely 
unambiguous, most of it points to the quite surprising result, that people in very different cultures, 
                                                     
5
 Needless to say, there are of course many other reasons, both intrinsic and instrumental. 
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seem to have a very similar notion of what should count as corruption. Survey results from regions 
in India and in Sub-Saharan Africa show that people in these societies take a very clear stand 
against corruption and views the problem in much the same manner as it is understood in for ex-
ample Denmark or by organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International 
(Afrobarometer 2006; Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001; Nichols, Siedel and Kasdin 2004; 
Widmalm 2005; Widmalm 2008)). To illustrate this, respondents to the Afro-barometer’s 2006 
survey in 18 African countries were asked of their views on the following scenarios where an offi-
cial: “decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters live”; 
“gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications”; and “de-
mands a favor or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job”. As can be seen 
from the figure below, a clear majority of the 25 086 respondents considered all three hypothetical 
actions of the official as “wrong and punishable”, while only a small minority viewed such actions 
as “not wrong at all”. Furthermore, the group that deems these actions “wrong but understanda-
ble” is also surprisingly small.   
 
FIGURE 4, UNDERSTANDINGS OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
Source: Afrobarometer (2006), n = 25 086 for Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mala-
wi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Widmalm (2005, 2008) finds similar results in a survey study of villages in India. Widmalm finds 
that the Weberian civil servant model (impartial treatment of citizens disregarding income, status, 
class, caste, gender, and religion), although an absent figure in these villages, has surprisingly large 
support among the village population. In other words, the idea put forward, by among others Hei-
denheimer (2002)(2002) as well as by most anthropologists (Torsello and Vernand 2016), that the 
public acceptance of what is commonly understood as corruption varies significantly across cul-
tures, is not finding support in this type of studies.  
 
The existence of a universal understanding of corruption has been questioned also among post-
colonial theorists (for an overview of this literature see Gustavson 2014). However, it can be point-
ed out that in Frantz Fanon’s classic book “The Wretched of the Earth’, which in many ways is 
ideologically the most important and founding text for the post-colonial approach to development 
issues, the author himself points to corruption among the new political elite as a serious malady for 
West-Africa. In Fanon’s words:  
 
Scandals are numerous, ministers grow rich, their wives doll themselves up, the members of par-
liament feather their nests and there is not a soul down to the simple policeman or the customs 
officer who does not join in the great procession of corruption (Fanon 1967, 67).  
The reluctance by many scholars in the post-colonial approach to look at corruption as a serious 
problem for the countries they study is thus difficult to understand. In sum, there are both norma-
tive but also strong empirical grounds for opting for a universal understanding of corruption and 
the opposite of corruption. However, this does not exclude that there are different types of corrup-
tion and that the connection between corruption and the political system can differ (Rothstein and 
Torsello 2014). This is not different from saying that while we can have a universal definition of 
what constitutes representative democracy, the specific institutional configuration of democracies 
varies a lot. The Swiss democracy is institutionally very different from the Canadian version, which 
in turn, is different from what they have in Denmark. 
 
If the issue is lower corruption, we need to know what it is. Moreover, we need to have an idea of 
what the opposite of corruption is. In a number of publications, I have argued that the opposite to 
corruption should be equal (high) quality of government and that the basic norm for such a quality 
is the following: “When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything into consider-
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ation about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law (Rothstein & Teorell 2008, 
cf. Rothstein 2014, Rothstein and Tannenberg 2015, Rothstein and Varraich 2016). I have argued 
and showed empirically that such a definition is universal in the sense that it is not bound by culture 
or history. 
 
One way to think about the logic of impartiality is to make an analogy to sports, for example soccer 
(football). The football clubs in a national (or regional, or local) football league are in stark competi-
tion and they all really want to win the league, almost at all costs. However, the football clubs also 
want to secure the existence of a functioning and well-organized league that has legitimacy both 
among their own supporters as well as among supporters in general. If this is going to work, the 
clubs will have to come together and produce two things. One is a set of rules for the games that all 
“reasonable” clubs are willing to accept. They also need a set of rules for the organization of the 
league (how transfers of players should be done, how to handle teams whose supporters interfere 
with the matches, etc.). For this to work, they need to produce officials (referees and league manag-
ers) who are guided by the principle of impartiality. For example, individuals that are “die hard” 
fans of a specific club in the league will not be accepted as referees. A referees that is willing to 
favor a team for money will be seen as corrupt and shunned by supporters of all teams. If club A 
knows that club B has bribed the referee, they will either leave the match or they will start overbid-
ding in bribes and then the league will collapse (as was the case in the famous 2006 football corrup-
tion case in the Italian national league, cf. Hill 2008). Also, players usually do not like to play in a 
team where they can take for granted that some of their team-mates are “on the take” (this is ap-
parently why so many players from South America prefer to play in Europe). It should be noted 
that the importance of impartiality in the governing a football leagues seems to be universally un-
derstood and accepted. The Confederations of African and the South American Football Confed-
eration do not differ in this respect from their European or North American counterparts. Clubs 
and supporters from these parts of the world do not think of the rulebook produced by the Fédéra-
tion Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) as a Western Imperialist Post-Colonial treaty alien to 
their cultures. After all, we are talking about the world’s most popular sport. As the eminent politi-
cal philosopher John Rawls has stated: “it is supposed that if institutions are reasonably just, then it 
is of great importance that the authorities should be impartial and not influenced by personal, mon-
etary, or other irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases" (Rawls 1971, 58).  
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Impersonal or Impartial? 
Fukuyama (2014) as well as North et al. (2009) use the term “impersonal” instead of the term sug-
gest here (“impartial”). This is in all likelihood by these authors seen merely as a terminological and 
not a conceptual difference. However, in dictionaries, impersonal is defined as “having or showing no 
interest in individual people or their feelings: lacking emotional warmth”6, or as “lacking friendly human feelings or 
atmosphere; making you feel unimportant”7. In contrast, “impartial” is typically defined as “not supporting 
one person or group more than another”8, or as “not prejudiced towards or against any particular side or party; fair; 
unbiased”9  
 
The reasons for why we should prefer “impartial” to “impersonal” is based on the notion that 
states, when producing public goods/services, do not only or even for the most part rely on per-
sonnel that have legal training or orientation (Fukuyama 2014, 95). Fukuyama also argues that this 
type of bureaucratic rigidity, when policies are implemented with “no interest in individual people or their 
feelings”, is what people usually despise about the state apparatus. Instead, both western and devel-
oping states use a number of professions or semi-professions, such as, doctors, teachers, school 
principals, nurses, urban planners, architects, engineers, social workers, etc. when implementing 
public policies. For many of these professions, the idea that they would be working according to 
the “rule of law” in the sense that they implement rules in an “impersonal” manner makes little 
sense. They do of course follow the laws, but as is well-known from the literature about policy 
implementation, the laws that are supposed to guide what these professions do have to be quite 
general and thereby they do not entail precise information of how to handle each and every case 
(Hill and Hupe 2002; Winter 2003). Instead, what is important for these groups when implementing 
public services, is the standards, knowledge and ethics that are established by their professions. 
Moreover, we do not want nurses, teachers, people that work in elderly care or doctors to have “no 
interest in individual people or their feelings” or to be “lacking emotional warmth” when they do their job. On 
the contrary, we want them (and they usually also want) to be personally engaged in and committed 
to their job (Brante 2014, 124-132). Some feminist scholars have presented this “modus operandi” 
                                                     
6
 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impersonal 
7
 Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/impersonal 
8
 Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/impartial 
9
 Collins Dictionaries, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/impartial 
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as a special logic of care as opposed to for example an economic logic of rational self-interest or a 
bureaucratic logic as strict rule-following (Stensöta 2010; Stensöta 2015; Tronto 2013). For exam-
ple, parents at the typical Danish public pre-school do not want the pre-school teacher to be “lack-
ing friendly human feelings” when teaching and taking care of their children. However, they would be 
extremely upset if they were to discover that the pre-school teachers had given special favors or 
treatment to some kids because their parents had paid them money under the table or because they 
belonged to some ethnic/religious group etc. The only legitimate reason they have for giving some 
children more attention than others is if this can be motivated by the standards established in the 
profession of what is good teaching and care for different children (Brante 2014, 124-132). The 
professional groups in the state are supposed to have some autonomy/discretion in order to use 
their professional competence and judgement, but this should not be used in a way that can be 
deemed as giving undue favors. In other words, they should be impartial but not impersonal.  
 
Does Impartiality in Government Work? Empirical Results 
The QoG Institute has carried out an expert survey covering 105 countries in order to capture the 
degree of impartiality in the public administration. A number of questions from this survey have 
been used to construct an “impartiality index” (Rothstein and Teorell 2012). As shown from the 
figure below, the correlation between impartiality in the exercise of public power and the “Good 
Society Index” is substantial. 
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FIGURE 5, GOOD SOCIETY INDEX AND IMPARTIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
While it can be argued that “government effectiveness” used in Figure 3 above is conceptually close 
to the variables in the Good Society Index (GSI), the same cannot be said of impartiality. The cor-
relation between impartiality in the public administration and the GSI is twice as strong as for de-
mocracy and GSI (see Figure 2). Moreover, a recent paper by Ahlerup et al (2016), analyzing twenty 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, shows that countries whose governments are perceived as impar-
tial by the population are more likely to experience sustained economic growth. They conclude that 
“in order to ensure economic development, it is not only important to choose the “right” policies, 
but also to implement these policies in a fair manner” (2016, 78).    
 
In a number of articles and in a forthcoming book, Dahlström and Lapuente have, together with 
some colleagues from the Quality of Government Institute at University of Gothenburg, made a 
strong case for the positive effects on controlling corruption in a meritocratic civil service (Charron 
et al. 2016; Charron, Dahlstrom and Lapuente 2012; Dahlström and Lapuente 2016; Dahlström, 
Lapuente and Teorell 2011). They argue that the preferred system is when the power of democrati-
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cally elected politicians is balanced by the influence of a meritocratic civil service. The causal mech-
anism they identify is that these groups have different sources of legitimacy and that they are held 
accountable to different standards. Politicians in power base their legitimacy on the amount elec-
torate support they can muster and also the support they get from party activists to which they are 
held accountable. Meritocratic civil servants and experts in government base their legitimacy on 
respect within their peer-groups to which they are held accountable. Dahlström and Lapuente 
(2016) argue that when groups with different sources of legitimacy have to work closely together, 
they will monitor each other and this “pushes both groups away from self-interest towards the 
common good”. Logically, this also implies that “abuse of power will be more common if everyone 
at the top has the same interest, because no one will stand in the way of corruption and other self-
interests”. Thus, what determines success or failure in these two groups is very different. This ele-
gant theory is supported by a wealth of both historical and large-n comparative empirical analyses. 
Empirically, meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, as opposed to political appointment, is found 
to reduce corruption. This remains true even when controlling for a large set of alternative explana-
tions, such as political, economic, and cultural factors, that previously were seen as important for 
the functioning of the public sector. The conclusion is that a professional bureaucracy, in which 
civil servants are recruited strictly on the basis of their qualifications and skills, rather than their 
loyalty to the politicians, is a very important factor for handling the “fairness” question in the epis-
temic approach to democracy as it has been operationalized here. One mechanism behind this is 
that, when faced with corruption or inefficient management of public resources, it is easier for civil 
servants to protest or act as a whistleblower, than if he or she were dependent on and loyal to the 
politicians. The chance that someone exposes corruption or other forms of malfeasance is simply 
larger if the potential exposer is not dependent on those engaged in the corruption.  
 
Interestingly enough, Dahlström and Lapuente do not find a positive effect of, what is known as 
the “closed” Weberian system of public administration with special exams, isolation from the pri-
vate sector by special employment laws and guaranteed life-long employment. 10  Instead, it is 
“open” meritocratic system, such as in Australia, Canada and Sweden, where employment in the 
civil service is open also for applicants from the private sector and where there is not much differ-
ence in employment laws between the private and the public sector. The positive effect on control-
ling corruption comes only from meritocracy and a de-politicized civil service while the traditional 
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 Typical example are Germany and South Korea 
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Weberian closed bureaucracy fails to deliver. Empirically, the extent to which the civil service is 
politicized in OECD countries varies enormously. Figures are somewhat uncertain but the lowest 
seems to be Denmark where only about 25 “ministerial advisors” are exchanged when there is a 
change of government. In Sweden, it is about 200, in Italy about 1600. In the United States the 
number of “spoils” appointments are about 3500 and in Mexico about 70.000 civil servants have to 
leave their positions if there if a national election results in a change of government (Garsten, Roth-
stein and Svallfors 2015).  In most developing, and possibly also in former communist countries, 
the figures are in all likelihood much higher.   
 
To this one should add that meritocracy, everything else being equal, increases the competence in 
the public sector and thereby state capacity. Using data from an Expert Survey for the study of the 
public administration in 126 countries, carried out by the Quality of Government Institute, a posi-
tive correlation is found between a measure of impartiality in the civil service and several standard 
measures of population health including the UNDP measure of human well-being (Rothstein and 
Holmberg 2015). A study of Peru and Bolivia finds that the implementation of aid programs can be 
seriously obstructed if there are high turnover rates among public sector employees, especially if 
they are recruited on a political basis. The reason is that loyalty among politically recruited public 
officials lies with the appointing political party, rather than with the public institution, and political-
ly recruited officials are therefore often reluctant to take over the implementation of aid programs 
that have been established under the former government. This is problematic for development 
agencies, as the implementation timeline of aid programs do not correspond to the term of office 
of the elected government appointing public sector personnel. The simple correlation between 
meritocratic recruitment and corruption is, as shown in the figure below, quite impressive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  21 
FIGURE 6, MERITOCRATIC RECRUITMENT AND CORRUPTION 
  
Sources:  Meritocratic recruitment is taken from the QoG Institute’s Expert Survey (Dahlström et al 2011) and the measure of 
Corruption is from World Bank Control of Corruption Index 2010. 
 
 
But Is Impartiality Possible? A “Churchillian” Approach 
So far, we have put forward four results. 1) Corruption in its various forms is a serious social ill. 2) 
Democracy is not a safe cure against corruption. 3) Increased gender equality seems to be one im-
portant factor behind getting corruption under control. 4) Impartiality in the exercise of public 
power, not least, when it “translates” into meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the public 
administration, has a powerful effect on lowering corruption. There are certainly many different 
definitions of what should constitute gender equality, but I think it is fair to say that impartiality in 
the form of not taking a person’s gender into account when implementing public policies is one 
central ingredient.  
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In this discussion, Fukuyama has argued that acting according to norms such as impartiality does 
not “come natural” to humans. Instead, if given a position of power, according to Fukuyama (2014, 
89) our “natural inclinations” is to use this power to promote our self, our family, our kin, friends, 
clan, tribe, and one could add political faction or party. Especially nepotism seems to be a strong 
factor when looked at empirically. The understanding that impartiality in the exercise of public 
power should take precedence over various forms of self- or group interests is according to Fuku-
yama something that must be learnt through some form of public ethos. 
 
The problem, however, is that we have at least four quite strong approaches in the social sciences 
which in an almost axiomatic way deny the possibility of impartiality. Inspired by neo-classical eco-
nomics, the public choice approach to government starts from the assumption that civil servants 
are operating according to the “rent-seeking model”, where agents are self-interested utility maxi-
mizers (Mueller 1997).11 This is of course an axiom that is anathema to impartiality. The same can 
be said of most economic analyses built on notions that what dominates human motivation is self-
interests (Weingast and Wittman 2006). In Marxism, the state is usually seen as an arena for the 
exercise of interest-based politics which of course rules out the notion of impartiality (Therborn 
2008). In what is known as political economy, various forms of material or positional (power) inter-
ests dominate. In addition, several identity-oriented approaches where the idea that a person with 
identity X could make an impartial evaluation of the merits of a person with identity Y, is seen as 
impossible (Burke and Stets 2009). Iris Marion Young, for example, states the following: ”the ideal 
of impartiality serves ideological functions. It masks the ways in which the particular perspectives 
of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify hierarchical decision making structures” 
(1990, 97). She also stated that impartiality is an “impossible ideal because the particularities of and 
affiliation cannot and should not be removed from moral reason” (ibid). In addition, the approach 
in development studies known as “post-colonialism” understands principles such as impartiality as 
an expression of Western semi-imperialist ideology (de Maria 2010). In sum, the idea of defining 
the opposite of corruption based on the notion of impartiality is far from uncontroversial.  
 
Feminist approaches seem to have a more mixed approach to the idea of impartiality. Several femi-
nist scholars have argued that the interests of women are best served if rules are transparent, clear 
and applied in what I would call an impartial manner (Kittilson). For recruitment to electable posi-
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 This “Handbook of Public Choice” does not have index entries neither for the term “corruption” nor for “impartiality”. 
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tions in political parties, Bjarnegård (2013) has shown that lack of formal rules is detrimental for 
gender equality. In recruitment to academic positions, several studies show that systems that in-
cludes clear rules and explicit standards tend to be positive for increased gender equality (Brouns 
2000; Husu 2000; van den Brink, Brouns and Waslande 2006)12. There is also a negative effect of 
corruption on general intergenerational social mobility. In corrupt or clientelistic systems, families 
with strong economic resources seem to be able to use their money or contacts/networks to get 
their comparatively unambiguous and/or untalented children into goods schools and place them at 
good jobs (Charron and Rothstein 2016)   
 
However, there is no lack of studies, also using methods such as controlled experimental approach-
es, showing that, for example, student evaluations of academic teachers, teachers’ evaluations of 
and attention to students, and employers’ evaluation of job candidates, are prone with gender bias, 
race/ethnic bias and bias against people with some types of immigrant background (for some re-
cent examples see Bursell 2014; Grohs, Adam and Knill 2016; MacNell, Driscoll and Hunt 2015; 
Midtboen 2016; Nunley et al. 2015). Some of this bias is intentional and some probably unintended. 
Be that as it may, the effect is what counts. Acting according to the norm of impartiality seems thus 
quite difficult. The empirical support for some kind of “inbuilt” propensity for bias when A is go-
ing to decide what B is going to get (job, promotion, housing, benefit) seems strong.  
 
How to deal with these results is from a policy perspective not easy of self-evident. One problem is 
of course how to decide how much preferential treatment a group should have given the existence 
of systematic bias above. A second problem is the sort of compensatory instruments that should be 
used (quotas, “soft” affirmative action, monetary compensation or extra resources). A third prob-
lem is of course that while members of a group can be victims of discrimination it is not certain 
that this is the case for all individuals in the group. Various forms of preferential treatment may 
benefit only the “elite” within the discriminated group leaving the rest maybe even worse of. A 
forth problem is how many and which groups we should include in various compensatory schemes. 
In a Scandinavian type of society, to take one example, we have to count social class, gender, sexual 
orientation, various forms of medical disabilities, a number of religions and ethnicities and maybe 
                                                     
12
 Many thanks to Elin Bjarnegård for her generosity in orienting me in this field of research. 
  24 
also age. Just to take one example, University of California at Davies now counts seven sexual ori-
entations in their resource center for support to sexual minorities.13 
 
In principle, none of these identity groups are mutually exclusive (even if, admittedly, some are 
probably quite rare). Two “biological” sexes times seven sexual orientations times ten ethnic groups 
times five religious times five types physical challenges make 3500 possible combinations. Imple-
menting preferential treatment for all these groups in a way that would receive broad based legiti-
macy is probably impossible since this would, following the Skocpol and Svallfors problems men-
tioned above, in all likelihood create bureaucratic and administrative “nightmares” including many 
decisions in the implementation process that would be seen as favoritism and even various forms 
of corruption. From the perspective of increased social justice (including the feminist perspectives), 
this is likely to be a hard choice.  
 
One way to think about this “unsolvable” problem could be to adapt a “Churchillian” approach. 
Like liberal representative democracy, impartiality as quality of government may be very far from a 
perfect system, but given the empirical results presented above, it may be the best we can come up 
with since all the alternatives are worse. Another comparison is with political equality as the basic 
norm for liberal representative democracy a suggestion by noted democracy theorist Robert Dahl 
(Dahl 1989). Given the very large and usually accumulative differences between citizens in econom-
ic resources, human capital and usable networks, every known democracy today must be said to be 
light years away from anything that comes even close to the realization of political equality. It is not 
certain that the deviations from the principles of impartiality in the exercise of political power men-
tioned above are greater than the differences in equal possibilities to influence politics via the sys-
tem of representative democracy. In both cases, as the political philosophers would state it, we are 
in for non-ideal theory. If we could find a way to measure how far the two ideals are from reality, I 
would put my money on the principle of impartiality being closer to the ideal than the principle of 
political equality.  
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